Past Performance is No Guarantee of Future Returns
Based on past experiences, history has been brutal on democracies that do not adapt to or embrace the latest technologies. The Austrian-Prussian battle at Königgrätz in 1866 is a notable example of a lesser-equipped army claiming victory by utilizing the latest technologies within their strategies. The key not being the technologies themselves but the way Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke and the Prussian General Staff applied them (Boot 463). This concept has not changed; only the rate and speed at which new technologies emerge have.
The lesson for democracies to note is the dangers of not adapting sufficiently and anticipating the latest technologies. A superior military, such as the Austrian military in 1866, experienced defeat by simply underestimating new technologies and failing to account for them in their battle strategies. Military revolutions begin by incorporating new technologies into existing systems, as Krepinevich observed, stating, "emerging technologies only make military revolutions possible." (5). Austria appeared to resist the technological revolutions of the time and therefore suffered unexpected results. Interestingly, the effort to adapt as described portrays emerging technologies as something to subscribe to, taking or leaving at will, when history has shown that it is more equated to a life raft needed to bear the latest raging tide.
The emergence of nuclear technology demonstrates the ripple effect of new and sometimes hazardous technologies. When Oppenheimer and his team developed the first nuclear bomb as a result of the Manhattan Project (Fehner and Gosling 4), two things became apparent as the reality of the weapon was realized. First, any country without nuclear technology is at the mercy of the countries with it. The disparity between the current and emerging military technologies was so vast that a cataclysmic power shift ensued. Amongst numerous other issues, non-nuclear entities had to work through; they were then forced to recognize the threat of nuclear power being leveraged until they either entered into an agreement or treaty with a nuclear nation or developed their nuclear powers. Secondly, once one entity introduces an emerging technology into its military strategies and the world, it becomes impossible to undo or put it back in the box. Like Krepinevich's observation discussed previously, it is not the mere existence of the technology that causes a revolution; it is its integration into existing strategies and affairs. Artificial intelligence is no different; now that its uses have been recognized across industries and within military capacities, the race to develop and integrate the technology has begun leading us to the beginning of what Hoffman calls the "Autonomous Revolution" (20).
Retaining competitiveness does not always look like the best offensive capabilities; defensive technologies are also critical. In reference to the development of nuclear technologies, Chin observed the sensitivity of nuclear deterrence capabilities - noting the utility of offensive capabilities as a deterrent. Chin stated, “… a premium came to be placed on technological innovation in defense" (769). As AI develops and becomes more sophisticated, the disadvantage to those not utilizing the technology will grow even deeper. Thus revealing the heavy influence private and commercial sector technological development has on current and future military functions. To further elaborate, Hoffman noted that the "Army forecasted … revolutionary shifts in technology "may even challenge the very nature of warfare itself"" (210). Indicating a failure to adapt would mean more than just losing competitiveness; it could mean a total demise in the future. A notion shared by Boot as well, understanding that the situation historically, many times over, has been "change or die," and failure to does not just result in the sting of defeat but also the "agony of their members dying in great numbers" (466). The outward appearance of artificially intelligent systems appears much less intimidating than nuclear weaponry and, therefore, could result in an understandable underestimation by adversarial forces, at least initially.
A caveat is that not all democracies have access to or the ability to leverage the latest technologies and instead find themselves in a further less than advantageous position. Schwab noted that the industry of technology is polarized with "systems [that] are biased in overt or subtle ways, or through the operations of institutions that tend to privatize profits and concentrate wealth and opportunities" (30). Democracy may be open and willing to embrace emerging technologies but not immediately able to. As artificial intelligence continues to gain sophistication, the militaries that do not or cannot integrate autonomous systems will be at a severe disadvantage. Autonomous systems offer the advantage of incredible precision and speed in analysis, decision-making, and targeting (Brooks). They are also more dependable than humans and highly trustworthy, contradicting the average sci-fi fan's opinion. Even software modeled after the human brain is not prone to change its "mind" or carry a risk of becoming radicalized, aside from the apparent risk of adversaries compromising the system the program is running on. A conflict between a military supported by autonomous systems and a well-staffed, armed, and offline (not using autonomous systems) military risks the same experience as Austria in the battle at Königgrätz discussed earlier.
Embracing emerging technologies in current military strategies and operations is imperative to maintaining competitiveness on the global stage and ensuring survival.
Boot, Max. War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World. 59928th ed., Avery, 2007. *Essay title is a quote from Boot, Pg 455.
Brooks, Rosa. “In Defense of Killer Robots.” Foreign Policy, 18 May 2015, foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/18/in-defense-of-killer-robots.
Chin, Warren. Technology, war and the state: past, present and future, International Affairs, Volume 95, Issue 4, July 2019, Pages 765–783, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiz106
Fehner, Terrence and Gosling, F.G. The Manhattan Project, US Department of Energy, April 2012, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files The%20Manhattan%20Project.pdf. Accessed 10 Apr. 2022.
Hoffman, F. G. "Will War's Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?," Parameters 47, no. 4 (2017): 19-31,doi:10.55540/0031-1723.3101.
Krepinevich, Andrew F. “Cavalry to Computer: The Pattern of Military Revolutions.” The National Interest, no. 37, 1994, pp. 30–42, http://www.jstor.org/stable 42896863. Accessed 10 Apr. 2022.
Schwab, Klaus, et al. Shaping the Future of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Illustrated, Currency, 2018.
