Misalignment in War Policy and the Power of National Will
Since World War II, the political and industrial landscape of the United States has changed. War has long been viewed and classified as an instrument of policy (Clausewitz 88). However, it appears that war as an instrument in pursuing war policy is no longer as effective for the United States as it was before World War II. Why did the advantages of military force begin to decline? What has changed? It was not the ability or application of military force that caused this result but rather the war policies pursued in emerging matters.
The post-World War II peace settlement entered into by the United States created boundaries for limited wars. It secured the U.S.'s dominant position as an economic and military global power. In 1984 the U.S. was recognized for having never been more powerful or dominant (Lauer). By all reasoning, this should have been the United States’ time to shine and prevail in conflicts; instead, it was an era of disappointing outcomes. A loss of touch with reality amongst policymakers is a probable explanation. As Kubiak stated, "If the war narrative is prone to collapse because of painful, unexpected consequences of war policy meeting reality, it follows that to prevent surprises, one should seek to keep the forces of war in balance." (157). Kubiak's framework provides an understanding of what went wrong when America went to war during this era; the war narrative collapsed due to weak war policies. As Clausewitz observed, "Once the expenditure of the effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow." (92).
A theme amongst American engagements post World War II was intervening in international civil wars. U.S. activities were mainly interjections into foreign affairs, thus degrading the national meaning of the war policies being pursued through conflict. Aligning with the framework presented by Clausewitz, the reason for the war was not sufficient enough to conjure national will, thus throwing the paradoxical trinity Clausewitz advocated out of balance.
Lauer observed that when the U.S. military gets involved in foreign civil affairs that if they do not have someone locally powerful to partner with, "these wars continue until either someone is found … to turn over the military missions for security, or the military forces are simply withdrawn in the acceptance of failed policy.". An example would be the war between the United States and Afghanistan. "By the time the U.S. and NATO combat mission formally ended in December 2014, the 13-year Afghanistan War had become the longest war ever fought by the United States." (Britannica). At the end of the 20-year engagement in the year 2021, the U.S. left Afghanistan will almost nothing to show for it. Shortly after the U.S. occupation ended, the Taliban took over, leaving the territory in worse shape than before U.S. forces arrived. The U.S. was unsuccessful, hoping to end the civil war and free the Afghan people from "a stifling, doctrinaire theocracy.” Instead, it left a power vacuum in the wake of destruction behind, leaving Afghanistan vulnerable to a hostile occupation by another force (The Economist). Referring back to Lauer's statement, there was no dominant power to turn over the military mission to by the time it became clear that the expenditure of effort exceeded the value of the political object. Following Clausewitz's prescription, the object should have been renounced, and efforts to seek peace should have followed.
The results of U.S. wartime engagements (post World War II), like the war in Afghanistan resulted in a loss of faith in war and policy amongst soldiers and the U.S. population, thus beginning a destructive cycle and breaking down the balance of national will in war. In light of American discontent, policymakers felt pressure to justify the war policy decisions and the cost associated with war and lives lost. “The more lives lost, the greater the need” to justify involvement, which would result in interventions such as sending more troops (Lauer). However, this did not improve the conditions or the outcome, causing the legitimacy of war policy to come under scrutiny, thus revealing a fundamental imbalance. Kubiak prescribed a return to the idea of the paradoxical trinity of balance set forth by Carl von Clausewitz. He argued that returning to the realities of enmity, chance, and reason could restore an understanding of national will (157). Supposing that the cost of lives could be reasonably justified, the discontent amongst the American people may subside and balance could be restored - therefore showing the importance of reason in war policy regarding national support and will for war.
As observed, imbalance occurs when war policy begins to lose touch with reality: a loss of national will can affect the outcomes of war engagements. However, if the United States were a dominant force during this period, it would make sense to reason that any war policy could be achieved. Something as fragile as perception should not affect the outcomes in favor of the tangible forces readily available to engage in war. This concept has proven not to be the reality of the situation. As Lauer noted:
"In each instance of discontent, such as Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan … it was a failure of policy, the loss of legitimacy of the war narrative, that created the perception of discontent, and hence frustration with the military strategy that emerged to achieve the stated policy aims of each conflict." (Lauer)
The point of failure occurs at the policy level and in the pursuit of misaligned war policies that do not maintain balance, effectively resulting in disappointing failures each time these engagements are pursued.
Works Cited
“Afghanistan War | History, Combatants, Facts, and Timeline.” Encyclopedia Britannica, www.britannica.com/event/Afghanistan-War. Accessed 6 Feb. 2022.
Clausewitz, Carl von, et al. On War¸ Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Kubiak, Jeffrey. War Narratives and the American National Will in War. 1st ed. 2014, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
Lauer, Stephen. “American Discontent: Unhappy Military Outcomes of the Post-Second World War Era.” The Strategy Bridge, 23 May 2017, thestrategybridge.org/thebridge/2017/5/23/american-discontent-unhappy-military-outcomes-of-the-post-second-world-war-era?rq=lauer.
The Economist. “America’s War in Afghanistan Is Ending in Crushing Defeat.” The Economist, 11 July 2021, www.economist.com/leaders/2021/07/10/americas-longest-war-is-ending-in-crushing-defeat.