The Evolution of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: How Technology is Changing the Game
Insurgencies and uprisings have occurred in human history since the dawn of tribal conflicts. However, new concepts in modern times have emerged and differ from the classical paradigms of counterinsurgency strategies in part due to technological advancements and the shifts in globalization (also partly due to the evolution of technology). The focus was and is still in some locations localized to a threat group or region; however, technology has once again made an impact. In similar ways that technological advancements have played a significant role in a conflict's outcome if utilized correctly, technology as we know it is seeping into every corner of the globe and slowly changing the threat landscape and conflict patterns in its wake.
"The term' classical counterinsurgency' describes the theory of counter-revolutionary warfare developed in response to the so-called wars of national liberation from 1944 to about 1980." (Kilcullen 1). Naturally, the world has evolved since classical counterinsurgency was defined. A modern environment necessitates the emergence and development of new approaches and ways of thought. Additionally, Kilcullen identified two key concepts, that counterinsurgency is entirely dependent on the specific insurgency in question; and the reality that insurgency is a "struggle to control a contested political space, between a state (or group of states or occupying powers)" (112). Therefore, modern counterinsurgency will be tailored to the targeted insurgency, thus making the integration of technology essential as the insurgents recognize the utility of technological platforms and leverage them in their strategies.
Kilcullen stated, "One of the most significant 'globalisation effects' is the rise of a worldwide audience, giving insurgents near-instantaneous means to publicise their cause." (113). Communication being previously confined to the word of mouth and paper pamphlets, this ability has meant that causes can gain followers across the entire globe. It is phenomenal; this aspect has reconstructed the insurgents' platform and amplified their cause in previously impossible ways. The new patterns Kilcullen has observed and discussed in counterinsurgency, such as "conflict ecosystems," "global areas of influence," and "permanent containment," are responses to the changes in the terrain and the peoples that insurgencies are occurring on and around.
Conflict ecosystems, as Kilcullen discussed, are an excellent example of modern counterinsurgency that was also at play in the 2007 Surge in Iraq. Kilcullen describes a conflict ecosystem as a new element that a security force must control, breaking away from the original paradigm of a "single specific insurgent adversary" (122). The neighborhoods Biddle explains in Iraq were not only complex because of the ethnic and religious diversity but possessed the added complexity of communications amongst the groups aided by technology. This pattern was wholeheartedly present within this situation and created a more significant challenge to counter and control. The complexity mentioned is not solely because of the addition of technological tools; it is also an effect of globalization and increasing populations.
Kilcullen describes the security forces' "areas of influence" as needing to be expanded from their original definition to include neighboring towns and countries (121). Another element of insurgency and counterinsurgency practices that need to be reworked or redefined due to emerging modern patterns in people groups and the subsequent threats as a result. In the account of the Surge in Iraq, the neighborhoods were not homogenous (and still are not). Meaning the area of influence was naturally larger and included mixed people groups (different ethnicities and religions). Kilcullen also describes the expansion of insurgents operating across borders and exploiting the opportunity presented by a global 'virtual sanctuary' as he called it (121).
Permanent containment, another of Kilcullen's patterns discussed in modern counterinsurgency, is also a relevant concept that is a reality with the Surge in Iraq. Victory in this case, and many other cases, is not final. Kilcullen defines permanent containment as necessary in some instances to "prevent defeated insurgents [from transforming] into terrorist groups" (123). In the case of Iraq, the intermixed neighborhoods will likely continue to strike conflict among the groups. They are garnering the need for a long-term strategy to prevent future insurgencies and deter an area from becoming a hotbed for terrorist cells to form.
The new patterns in counterinsurgency witnessed in 2007 may have been considered new at the time but likely evolved now, observing the patterns 16 years later. We can, however, take away essential understandings that remain true in understanding the premise of insurgencies and how they form, regardless of what tools and technologies are used. Additionally, as Kilcullen stated, the same logic remains accurate and applicable to counterinsurgency strategies in that they will remain primarily dependent on the originating insurgency and strategies practiced
Biddle, Stephen, et al. “Testing the Surge: Why Did Violence Decline in Iraq in 2007?” International Security, vol. 37, no. 1, MIT Press - Journals, July 2012, pp.7–40. https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00087.
Kilcullen, David. “Counter-insurgency Redux.” Survival, vol. 48, no. 4, Informa UK Limited, Dec. 2006, pp. 111–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330601062790.
